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1Libya’s popular revolution of  2011 has unleashed the potential for more diverse and 
inclusive growth. In the short term, the country faces the complex and costly tasks of  
rebuilding its economy, infrastructure, and institutions, and responding to the demands 
of  its population, especially for improved governance. The conflict that accompanied 
the revolution had a severe impact on the economy, which is heavily dependent on 
hydrocarbons, but the contraction is expected to be temporary. The restoration of  
hydrocarbon production is already well advanced, and reconstruction efforts will boost 
non-hydrocarbon output growth in the coming years. Libya’s wealth opens a choice of  
paths for the future: it can fall into the trap of  many resource-rich countries that have 
become overly reliant on revenues from finite natural resources and failed to diversify their 
economies, or it can pursue a course of  sustainable, inclusive development led by increased 
private-sector activity.
The National Transitional Council (NTC) has taken steps to promote a 
peaceful political transition, to normalize economic conditions, and to set out a 
national reform agenda. In the short term, the authorities must restore security, 
bring hydrocarbon production fully online, exercise fiscal discipline, resuscitate 
the banking system, and maintain macroeconomic stability. But Libya also 
faces the formidable challenges of  responding to the underlying causes of  
the revolution and building a democratic regime in the midst of  heightened 
regional risks and global uncertainties. Therefore, medium-term efforts should 
focus on capacity building, infrastructure renewal, private-sector development, 
improving education, job creation, and putting in place an effective social safety 
net, within a framework of  transparent and accountable governance.
At the request of  the Libyan authorities, international financial institutions are 
engaged in policy consultations and technical assistance, aimed at maintaining 
macroeconomic stability and developing an institutional infrastructure to 
promote economic diversification and employment growth.
Libya beyond the Revolution:  
Challenges and Opportunities
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Conflict Devastates the Economy1
Hydrocarbons have long dominated the Libyan economy, accounting for more 
than 70 percent of  GDP, more than 95 percent of  exports, and approximately 
90 percent of  government revenue. With about 3.5 percent of  the world’s 
proven crude oil reserves, Libya has a prominent position in the international 
energy market. Before the revolution, its output was 1.77 million barrels 
per day of  crude oil (equivalent to 2 percent of  global output) and close to 
0.2 million barrels-equivalent of  natural gas.
Following the lifting of  earlier United Nations (UN) sanctions in 2003, 
economic activity increased steadily for seven years. During 2004–10, average 
real GDP growth was approximately 5 percent, annual consumer price 
inflation averaged less than 4 percent, and official foreign assets increased 
from $20 billion at end-2003 to $170 billion at end-2010. While the non-
hydrocarbon sectors grew rapidly, underpinned by an ambitious public 
investment program, Libya remained one of  the most hydrocarbon-dependent 
countries, with its exports among the least diversified in the world; its small 
private sector was handicapped by the ubiquitous dominance of  the state 
and by crippling institutional failures. Consequently, social and governance 
indicators remained poor, job creation was lackluster, and dependence on 
expatriate workers increased.2
Violent protests in Libya erupted on February 17, 2011, escalating rapidly into 
conflict. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Libya on February 26, 
which were broadened on March 17 to include a mandate for limited foreign 
military intervention and a freeze on Libya’s foreign assets. On October 23, the 
NTC declared liberation after defeating the military forces of  the former ruler, 
Moammar Gaddafi. The NTC announced the formation of  a new, transitional 
government on November 22 and plans to hold parliamentary elections by June 
23, 2012. The bulk of  Libya’s foreign assets were unfrozen on December 16, 
clearing the way for normalization of  the foreign exchange market.
As a consequence of  the conflict, crude oil production fell to 22,000 barrels 
per day in July 2011, although output was restored rapidly in the last quarter 
of  2011 to half  the pre-conflict level (Figure 1).
Non-hydrocarbon economic activity was affected by the destruction of  
infrastructure and production facilities, disruptions to banking activity, 
limited access to foreign exchange, and the departure of  expatriate workers. 
Consequently, with an estimated 50 percent contraction in non-hydrocarbon 
1 This report is based on data available as of  January 2012.
2 Pre-revolution statistics indicated an unemployment rate of  14 percent at end-2010. After the revolution, 
however, officials in the Ministry of  Labor and Capacity Building adjusted the estimated end-2010 
unemployment to approximately 26 percent.
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Sources: U.S. Energy information Administration; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 
Figure 1. Oil Production Collapsed
(In thousands of barrels per day, annual average)
output, total real GDP in 2011 was 60 percent lower than in 2010 (Figure 2 
and Table 1).
The Central Bank of  Libya (CBL), lacking access to its foreign assets, was unable 
to sell foreign exchange; the parallel market value of  the Libyan dinar (LD) fell, 
at one point reaching a low of  half  its official value. 3 With the unfreezing of  
foreign assets in late 2011, however, the spread between the official and parallel 
market exchange rates narrowed to less than 10 percent in early 2012. Even 
so, the consumer price index (CPI) increased significantly in 2011, reflecting 
physical constraints on imports, domestic supply limitations, and monetary 
expansion as well as exchange rate depreciation on the parallel market (Figure 3). 
Although the availability of  consumer price data during the conflict was limited, 
estimates indicate that the CPI increased by about 20 percent in 2011.
The loss of  hydrocarbon income during the conflict reduced Libya’s current 
account surplus. Exports declined from $48.9 billion in 2010 to $19.2 billion in 
2011, while imports dropped from $24.6 billion to $14.2 billion during the same 
period. As a result, the current account surplus narrowed from 21 percent of  
GDP in 2010 to less than 4½ percent of  GDP in 2011 (Figure 4).
The 2011 budget was reallocated to address the drop in hydrocarbon 
revenues, humanitarian needs, and a disruption of  most capital expenditures, 
as well as first-quarter policy changes, including increased salaries. Revenue is 
3 The official current exchange rate has been pegged to the SDR at LD1 = SDR 0.5175 since June 14, 2003.
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Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Figure 2. Revolution Had a Devastating Effect on the Economy
(Annual percentage change)
h
Table 1. Economic Shock from the Revolution is Expected to be Temporary
Proj. 
2012 2010 2011 
Real GDP, annual percentage change  2.9 –60.0  69.7 
 Non-hydrocarbon  7.0 –50.0  20.0
 Hydrocarbon –1.2 –70.9  163.3 
CPI inflation 
 End-period  3.3  19.2 –10.4 
 Period average  2.5  14.1   1.9 
Overall budget balance, percent of  GDP  4.9 –42.8  –6.8 
External current account, percent of  GDP  20.8  4.4  11.2 
Total foreign assets ($ billion), of  which:    172    174   174
 Gross official reserves    103    106    82 
Oil production, millions of  barrels per day   1.77    0.51   1.35 
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff  estimates.
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Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Figure 3. Supply Bottlenecks Pushed Prices Higher
(Consumer price index, 2003 = 100)
estimated to have declined by 69 percent in nominal terms, from 57 percent 
of  GDP in 2010 to 39 percent of  GDP in 2011. Spending on wages rose 
by approximately 60 percent, driven by a March 2011 public-sector wage 
increase. The 2011 budget was financed by domestic borrowing of  LD 13.5 
billion, as well as arrears estimated at LD 6 billion (Table 2).
During and immediately after the revolution, the financial situation of  the 
public sector was precarious, with the government financing expenditures 
by borrowing from the CBL and by drawing down deposits at the CBL. The 
money supply increased due to monetization of  the budget deficit; currency in 
circulation doubled from LD 7.5 billion at end-2010 to LD 15.4 billion at end-
2011. Although currency in circulation doubled, demand for cash increased 
even more, resulting in a shortage of  liquidity in the banking system, which 
the CBL addressed by imposing a limit on cash withdrawals by individuals 
from the banking system.4
The economic upheaval in Libya has also had significant spillovers globally 
and regionally. Prior to the conflict, Libya accounted for 2 percent of  
global crude oil production, and the loss of  Libyan oil exports created 
a temporary shortfall in the international market. In addition, Libya had 
4  Currency in circulation was equivalent to approximately $12 billion at end-2011. The CBL issued the 
equivalent of  $2 billion in LD in newly printed notes, and reissued the equivalent of  $4 billion in banknotes that 
had been withdrawn from circulation. The statutory limit on monthly cash withdrawals was equivalent to $600, 
although commercial banks imposed lower limits based on availability of  cash.
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Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Figure 4. Loss of Hydrocarbon Income Worsened  
Fiscal and External Accounts
(In percent of GDP)
hosted approximately 1.5 million migrant workers; an abrupt exodus of  
expatriate workers reduced remittances and added to the already large 
pool of  unemployed in Libya’s neighboring countries. More generally, 
Table 2. Loss of Hydrocarbon Revenues Hits Public Finances
Est. Est. Proj.
2010 2011 2012
(In billions of  Libyan dinars)
Nominal GDP 102 46 96
Revenue and grants  58 18 56
Expenditure, of  which:  53 37 62
 Wages and salaries   9 15 18
 Subsidies and transfers  12 12 15
Overall balance   5 −20 −7
(In percent of  GDP)
Revenue and grants  57 39 58
Expenditure, of  which:  52 82 65
 Wages and salaries   9 32 19
 Subsidies and transfers  12 26 16
Overall fiscal balance   5 – 43 −7
External current account  21 4 11
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff  estimates.
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7Financial Sector Reforms on Hold 
the intensification of  regional turmoil due to the Libyan conflict further 
contributed to deterring tourism and foreign investment.
Financial Sector Reforms on Hold
Before the revolution, Libya’s financial sector had been undergoing reform. 
Prior to 2007, the five largest commercial banks were fully owned by the CBL. 
Reforms included partial privatization and the involvement of  foreign partners 
in six out of  the 16 banks.5 Nevertheless, much of  the banking system remains 
under the control of  the government, and state-owned specialized credit 
institutions play a major role in the financial sector.6 
The performance of  the banking sector had improved: total commercial 
bank assets increased from LD 14.5 billion at end-2003 to LD 65.4 billion 
at end-2010. Financial soundness indicators improved over the period, with 
nonperforming loans declining to 17.2 percent (from 35.5 percent in 2004), 
loan provisioning increasing to 85 percent (from 51.8 percent in 2004), and the 
regulatory capital ratio increasing to 17.3 percent, compared to 10.4 percent 
in 2004 (Table 3).
As a result of  the conflict, the banking sector balance sheet is likely to have 
worsened. Economic disruption will delay some loan repayments, as asset 
quality has deteriorated (mostly through physical destruction). In addition, 
loans that may have been made to entities of  the former regime may be 
irrecoverable. Moreover, the threat of  legal challenges to the seizure of  
property by the former regime creates potential risks for the banking sector, 
particularly if  these properties have been used as collateral.7
During the conflict, commercial banks suffered from a systemic liquidity 
crunch despite the doubling of  currency in circulation. The shortage of  
dinar cash was linked to the slow normalization of  the foreign exchange 
market and reflected a breakdown in the banking system infrastructure (in 
which commercial banks experienced difficulties making payments through 
the electronic system). The lack of  access to foreign exchange constrained 
commercial bank operations, undermined public confidence in banks, 
and further prompted the private sector to hoard cash; the hoarding was 
exacerbated by account holders’ fears of  difficulty in accessing deposits. 
5  Foreign participation in the banking system included BNP Paribas acquiring a stake in Sahara Bank (August 
2007) and the granting of  a license to Unicredit (August 2010).
6  Loans by the specialized credit institutions account for about one-third of  lending by the financial sector.
7  Starting in the late 1970s, tens of  thousands of  residential and commercial premises were confiscated by the 
former regime and were given, sold, or rented at below-market rates to new occupants.
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The unfreezing of  Libya’s foreign assets has allowed the CBL to provide 
foreign exchange liquidity to banks, which should normalize the demand for 
dinar banknotes and the operations of  commercial banking. Moreover, the 
announcement by the CBL that it intends to maintain the current exchange 
rate peg has bolstered confidence in the value of  the dinar. The restoration of  
the non-cash payment system should also help reduce the demand for cash.
Credit to the private sector declined by about 6 percent in 2011, compared to 
an increase of  14.3 percent in 2010. The change in the stock of  credit during 
2011 was affected by loan repayments, primarily through salary deductions, 
and limitations on trade financing due to constraints on access to foreign 
exchange. Linkages between the financial system and the real economy are 
weak, as evidenced by a ratio of  credit to GDP in 2010 of  less than 20 
percent. Nevertheless, reduced bank lending to the private sector is likely to 
have had an adverse impact on non-hydrocarbon economic activity.
Economic Recovery Takes Hold amid Risks
Economic activity is expected to show some recovery in 2012, concurrent 
with an improvement in the security situation. Crude oil production has 
exceeded 1 million barrels per day as of  early 2012, and is expected to reach 
the pre-conflict level in 2014. Non-hydrocarbon GDP is expected to recover 
by 2014, driven mainly by reconstruction. Although the CPI increased 
significantly in 2011, consumer price inflation is expected to ease now that 
imports have resumed and the CBL is withdrawing domestic currency 
from the system by selling foreign exchange.8 The external current account 
8  Some private capital outflows are expected in light of  restoration of  access to foreign exchange.
Table 3. Financial Indicators Likely to Have Worsened during the Conflict
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Regulatory capital to risk- 
 weighted assets
10.4 10.9 11.6 11.8 12.2 14.5 17.3
Nonperforming loans to  
 gross loans
35.5 31.7 26.1 26.2 22.5 17.0 17.2
Return on assets 0.4  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.3 1.0
Return on equity 6.8  8.6 9.9 10.2 13.6 23.7 15.0
Liquid assets to total assets 49.8 59.8 60.2 68.0 73.4 74.1 74.3
Loan provisions to  
 nonperforming loans
51.8 61.1 65.8 59.6 71.0 88.7 85.0
Source: Country authorities.
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surplus in 2012 will increase with the restoration of  hydrocarbon and non-
hydrocarbon exports.
Risks to the outlook include delays in normalizing the security situation, and 
lower international prices for crude oil and natural gas. Uncertainties in the 
security environment would constrain the economic recovery of  the private 
sector, and could impede the return of  expatriate workers who are needed to 
alleviate workforce bottlenecks. Intensifying strains in the euro area and global 
economic uncertainties have resulted in deteriorating financial conditions and 
exacerbated downside risks to global growth. Similarly, although hydrocarbon 
prices remain high, a deepening of  the European crisis and a widespread 
global economic slowdown could lower petroleum prices and present 
additional challenges to Libya’s hydrocarbon-dependent economy (Figures 5 
and 6).
Overall, in light of  diminished fiscal and external buffers, the Libyan 
authorities face significant short-term challenges (Figure 7). While responding 
to urgent social demands remains a priority, ensuring macroeconomic stability 
and maintaining investor confidence require greater policy coordination 
among various institutions. A peaceful political transition, underpinned by 
commitment to good governance and the rule of  law, is essential to securing 
economic progress.
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Figure 5. Libya Ranks among the Most Hydrocarbon-Dependent Countries
(Ratio of non-hydrocarbon GDP to total GDP)
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Figure 6. Public Finances Have Become More  
Dependent on Hydrocarbon Revenues
(Ratio of non-hydrocarbon revenue to total revenue)
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Figure 7. Short-Term Challenges
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Rapid Recovery Allows for Early Action on Medium-Term Reform
Early planning for the medium term can be a way to reap the advantages of  
a speedy economic recovery in the short term and inclusive growth over the 
medium term (Figure 8). To that end, Libya would benefit from developing 
a medium-term budget framework that ensures sustainable fiscal policies. In 
the short term, the authorities need to balance recurrent spending pressures 
against the need for fiscal sustainability and prospects for private-sector 
development. 
Wage increases implemented by the previous regime will raise the wage bill 
from 9 percent of  GDP in 2010 to about 19 percent of  GDP in 2012. A  
high level of  public-sector wages will reduce the incentive for individuals  
to seek employment in the private sector and will undermine efforts to 
advance economic diversification. The envisaged increase in subsidies  
will raise expenditures on subsidies from 11.7 percent of  GDP in 2010 to  
15.9 percent of  GDP in 2012. In 2012, revenues are expected to reach LD 
55.9 billion (57.9 percent of  the GDP), expenditures are estimated at LD  
62.4 billion (64.7 percent of  the GDP), and the deficit (to be financed through 
the issuance of  government bonds and a drawdown in government deposits 
at the CBL) is foreseen to reach LD 6.6 billion (6.8 percent of  the GDP). 
Although the government can afford to finance elevated current spending 
in the short term, the level of  recurrent spending is likely to be inconsistent 
with appropriate budgetary prioritization and fiscal sustainability and will exert 
upward pressure on the real exchange rate.
Over the medium term, fiscal consolidation will be required to offset the large 
increase in current spending in 2011 and 2012 and to provide the needed 
space for capital and reconstruction spending while preserving long-term 
Figure 8. Medium-Term Challenges
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fiscal sustainability. Capital spending, subject in the short term to capacity 
constraints, will have to be reassessed given urgent reconstruction needs, 
efficiency considerations, and the need to assess the limits of  the economy’s 
absorptive capacity.
Reforms are needed to contain the wage bill and increase the efficiency 
of  the public sector. Medium-term measures that have been implemented 
successfully in other countries include reducing reliance on the public 
sector as the main employer, decompressing the wage structure, aligning 
civil service remuneration with that of  the market, monetizing allowances 
to make compensation more transparent, introducing performance-
based incentives, computerizing payroll and personnel systems, and 
strengthening the recruitment system to depoliticize government hiring and 
professionalize the civil service.
Building a Comprehensive and Cost-Effective Social Safety Net
Subsidies and transfers will increase from 11.7 percent of  GDP before the 
revolution to 15.9 percent of  GDP in 2012, equivalent to 25 percent of  
total expenditure. Subsidies will remain elevated and create fiscal pressure. 
Subsidies affect consumption and production patterns as well as the allocation 
of  resources, with negative implications for the government budget, 
expenditure composition, and private-sector development. Subsidy reform 
over the medium term should aim to reduce economic inefficiencies while 
better protecting low-income households. Universal subsidies, particularly 
fuel subsidies, are not targeted; they disproportionately benefit higher-income 
households. 
Subsidy reform is often difficult to implement in the absence of  a social 
safety net to shield low-income households. If  the implementation of  a 
Figure 9. Heavy Reliance on Untargeted Subsidies Should Give Way  
to a Cost-Effective Social Protection Framework
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sophisticated social safety net is not feasible, the government could consider 
identifying a package of  short-term measures to mitigate the adverse impact 
of  price increases, and using some of  the savings from subsidy reform to 
increase public spending to benefit low-income households (Figure 9). The 
government could use established methods to improve targeting of  low-
income households, such as categorical or geographical application, or linking 
benefits to a self-targeting work program or schooling requirement. Although 
such measures are imperfect, they are more cost-effective in protecting low-
income households than are universal subsidies.
Strengthening Public Financial Management
Looking ahead, Libya faces a number of  challenges to establishing a robust, 
efficient, and transparent Public Financial Management (PFM) system and to 
ensuring sustainable use of  its hydrocarbon revenues.9 There is a need to set 
up a clear macro-fiscal policy framework with a consistent fiscal rule reflecting 
the country’s economic objectives and the volatile nature of  hydrocarbon-
based revenues. The sovereign wealth fund (SWF) managed by the Libya 
Investment Authority (LIA) and the Budget Reserve Account at the CBL 
should be fully integrated into this framework. Furthermore, the creation of  a 
macro-fiscal policy unit at the Ministry of  Finance would enhance fiscal policy 
formulation and help make the budget a strategic policy tool linking national 
policy objectives to macroeconomic performance.
The formulation of  Libya’s budget remains fragmented, mostly driven by a 
bottom-up approach that has been largely disconnected from explicit policy 
or development strategy. Libya would benefit from introducing reforms 
focused on ensuring a unified budget process (including full integration of  
recurrent and capital budgets), introducing a medium-term perspective to 
inform the annual budget, strengthening the policy context of  budgeting, and 
adopting a comprehensive and clear budget presentation. The linkage between 
policy priorities and budgetary allocations should be strengthened, and a 
budget preparation calendar established that specifies the roles and functions 
of  different agencies.
The Ministry of  Finance is the core institution for fiscal management, and 
needs to be at the center of  Libya’s economic policymaking, to ensure that 
capital and current expenditure decisions are fully integrated, particularly 
in light of  the re-establishment of  a Ministry of  Planning. An assessment 
9  At the request of  the authorities, the IMF and the World Bank have provided technical assistance in assessing 
the PFM framework and in enhancing internal governance of  the Libyan Investment Authority and have 
recommended measures to improve accountability and transparency. Both institutions continue to work closely 
with the authorities in implementing these recommendations.
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of  investment projects is necessary to decide on priorities within the 2012 
development budget.
To increase transparency and accountability and better inform economic 
policymaking, the thrust of  reforms should focus on developing and 
implementing an internationally accepted budget classification and its associated 
chart of  accounts to set the stage for the establishment of  a Government 
Financial Management Information System (GFMIS), which would improve the 
comprehensiveness, reliability, and timeliness of  budgetary information.
The efficient management of  the government’s liquid financial assets will 
require development of  a treasury single account (TSA) at the CBL that will 
consolidate all cash resources. Sub-accounts could enable accounting and 
control mechanisms required for budget execution. It is necessary to close 
non-core treasury accounts and to link the TSA to the SWF system. Excess 
cash balances at line ministry commercial bank accounts should be brought 
under the TSA, including trust and escrow funds; these accounts should then 
be swept into the TSA on a daily basis. The payments system should also 
become more dynamic and centralized. Once a GFMIS accounting system 
is implemented, the payments system can become fully centralized and 
integrated with the accounting and control system.
To ensure effective government cash planning, Libya needs to build capacity 
at the Ministry of  Finance and in line ministries for cash flow forecasting. As 
cash planning becomes more accurate and systematic, the Treasury will be 
able to identify cash flow forecasting errors and develop the methodology to 
calculate TSA cash buffer requirements. The cash buffer will have linkages 
to the SWF system as it interacts with budget execution for stabilization 
purposes. It will also be important to develop the T-bill market over the 
medium term for cash management purposes.
Developing a Dynamic and Transparent Sovereign Wealth Fund
Libya would also be well served by improving its SWF system, currently 
operating through the LIA and the Budget Reserve Account, with clearly 
defined inflow and outflow rules. Unlike the existing arrangement, it would 
need to be a dynamic and completely transparent and accountable system. The 
Budget Reserve Account and the LIA portfolio could be merged to create a 
single system with two sub-portfolios, with separate portfolio management 
objectives aligned with their respective stabilization and savings purposes.
The SWF system should be based on well-specified and regulated 
investment criteria. Domestic investments that could have an adverse 
impact on monetary policy or that could lead to conflicts of  interest and 
fragmentation of  the budget framework should be eliminated. Other than 
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outflow rules relating to long-term objectives or specified contingency 
events, outflows from the SWF system would only be earmarked to 
support the budget directly; all development spending would be channeled 
through the budget.
Diversification to Underpin a New Growth Strategy
Libya is overly dependent on hydrocarbons. Although non-hydrocarbon 
economic activity was growing at a rapid pace before the conflict, it still 
accounts for no more than 30 percent of  GDP and a negligible part of  total 
exports. The latest measures of  export diversification show that Libya scores 
poorly compared to other hydrocarbon-dependent economies in the region 
(Figure 10).10 Furthermore, unemployment appears to be a structural problem, 
particularly among the youth, and the identification of  policy measures and 
structural reforms that would create employment opportunities is critical  
(Figure 11). While considerable potential to expand hydrocarbon production 
exists, the hydrocarbon industry is capital intensive and therefore can make only 
a very limited contribution to employment growth. Hence, over the medium 
10  Export concentration is estimated using the Herfindahl-Hirschmann measure of  the degree of  market 
concentration, normalized to obtain values ranking from 0 to 1 (maximum concentration).
Figure 10. Libya Exports Almost Nothing but Hydrocarbons 
(Export concentration index, 1 = maximum concentration)
Source: Uinted Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
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term, the main challenges are to reorient the economy away from hydrocarbon 
dependence and to promote job creation and inclusive growth.
With the implementation of  appropriate policies, Libya can continue to 
benefit from its natural resources, develop a vibrant private sector, and 
reorient its economy away from hydrocarbon dependence. Achieving these 
goals requires a range of  well-targeted institutional reforms and prudent 
macroeconomic management.
There is significant scope for diversification into tourism and trade, in light 
of  Libya’s rich archeological sites, Mediterranean climate, and proximity to 
major European markets. The basic legal infrastructure for private-sector 
development was adopted in 2010; the next step is to ensure that the laws 
are implemented effectively, which will require coordination among agencies 
and an efficient and reliable judiciary. Libya will also need to upgrade basic 
infrastructure, including roads and electricity, with investment targeted at 
removing obstacles to economic development.
Improving Governance
An improvement in the business environment requires a governance 
framework that is transparent and includes clear accountability rules. This 
Figure 11. High Unemployment is a Structural Problem (2010)
Sources: Ministry of Labor and Capacity Building; International Labour Organization; and IMF staff calculations.
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framework would foster private-sector development by attracting much-
needed foreign expertise and investment, as well as the country’s skilled 
diaspora. Together with local entrepreneurs, the diaspora would help create 
new investments and job opportunities, and promote inclusive growth.
Prior to the conflict, Libya revamped its legal framework in an effort to 
improve conditions for private-sector activity. By early 2010, 22 new laws 
were passed to make fundamental changes to a range of  activities including 
commerce, customs, income tax, the stock market, labor, communication, 
and land registry. At the time, however, Libya ranked low on international 
measures of  governance, business conditions, and competitiveness (Figures 
12 and 13). The World Economic Forum found that Libya had better 
macroeconomic conditions than the regional average, reflecting primarily 
its record of  large fiscal surpluses and low debt. On most other indicators 
of  competitiveness, however, Libya scored poorly, ranking in the bottom 
10 on measures of  financial market development, innovation, labor market 
efficiency, business sophistication, and goods market efficiency. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit painted a similar picture, with Libya scoring 
poorly on polices related to private enterprise and competition.
Building Human Capital
A skilled labor force and a smoothly operating labor market are important for 
economic development. To complement the governance framework, emphasis 
should be placed on improving productivity through strengthening the 
education system and increasing human capital to support the private sector. 
Libya has a young population—close to 50 percent are below 25 years of  
age—with a large influx of  entrants to the labor market expected in the next 
decade. Transforming the economy will require a workforce with new skill 
sets, and private companies may struggle to find qualified and experienced 
personnel. To meet the demand, it will be important to establish training 
programs for workers and job seekers, and to reform the education system to 
reflect new needs, such as language and computer skills.
In addition, the size of  the civil service will need to be reduced, and public-
sector wages contained to limit growth in the reservation wage. The transition 
will not be easy: it will be important to strengthen social safety nets to support 
those in need while allowing the labor market to operate freely and effectively.
Developing the Financial Sector
Financial-sector intermediation is necessary to foster private-sector 
development (Figure 14). Well-functioning banking and financial sectors that 
provide broader access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises 
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Figure 13. Despite Reform Efforts, Business Conditions Did Not Improve (2010)
Sources: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2010–11; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Forecast, September 2010.
1 Economies ranked from 1–139, with first place being the most competitive. Regional Average is a simple average of the rankings for 
Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
2 Scores for 2005–09 based on a scale from 1 (very bad for business) to 5 (very good for business). Regional average is a simple average 
of scores for Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, 
Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.
Figure 12. Libya Scored Poorly in All Measures of Governance (2010)
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank, 2011. 
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would help in developing a vibrant non-hydrocarbon sector. In order to 
resuscitate the banking system, it will be important for the CBL, as banking 
supervisor, to verify that commercial banks have as clear a picture as possible 
of  the impact of  the recent conflict on their balance sheets, and to ensure that 
they have sufficient capital to cover losses and to continue lending during the 
reconstruction period. Prudential policies will also need to ensure that banks 
have diversified funding, as the introduction of  a TSA will adversely impact 
those banks that rely on government deposits as their main funding source.
The development of  a domestic debt market could provide the basis for 
more effective monetary policy and long-term financing to support economic 
diversification. Fixed-income instruments—including central bank bills 
that are regularly auctioned—could serve as a means of  managing short-
term liquidity and for institutions to match long-term assets and liabilities. 
In particular, an actively traded government bond market could eventually 
provide a base from which to price dinar-denominated corporate bonds.
A Comprehensive Agenda Calls for Sustained Commitment
Libya has an opportunity to break with the past, modernize the infrastructure 
of  its economy, and create private-sector employment opportunities for its 
citizens. Bolstered by its sizeable natural resource wealth and the recovery of  
Figure 14. Low Financial Intermediation Limits  
Private-Sector Development
(Credit to private sector as a share of GDP)
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
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the hydrocarbon sector, a post-revolution revival in the country’s economic 
activity should be rapid once the security situation normalizes. But Libya will 
also need a sustained commitment to comprehensive reforms to achieve its 
potential. The exchange rate peg to the SDR, which must be accompanied by 
fiscal restraint to prevent inflation and a damaging appreciation of  the real 
exchange rate, will continue to provide a policy anchor.
It is crucial that Libya advance structural reforms to support private-sector 
growth, economic diversification, and the creation of  employment for its 
young and growing labor force. Enhancing access to finance for entrepreneurs 
by developing the nascent financial sector will go a long way to create new 
employment opportunities and foster the growth of  the non-hydrocarbon 
economy. Such measures need to go hand in hand with strengthening the 
education system and increasing human capital.
The transition to a new and inclusive Libya will undoubtedly be challenging. 
To maintain the course and help mitigate the shift to private-sector-led 
growth, an efficient and comprehensive social safety net will be needed, as 
well as commitment by the authorities to policy predictability and consistency. 
Decision making should be supported by reliable data; it will be important 
to unify the compilation of  national statistics under the umbrella of  an 
independent agency, to improve the coverage, quality, and timeliness of  
statistics. Transparency will help reduce uncertainty, spur investor confidence, 
and attract the much-needed skilled diaspora, foreign expertise, and 
investment.
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